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 Security Measures Abroad and Extraterritorial  
Human Rights Obligations1
 ANGELA MÜLLER (Zürich)
1  Introduction
International human rights law (IHRL) was initiated after the Second World War as 
part of public international law, which in turn had been based on the Westphalian con-
cept of exclusive territorial sovereignty . As a result, IHRL has been informed by this 
territorial paradigm: A state is, first and foremost, obligated to respect, protect and 
fulfil human rights of those located on its territory . In light of today’s globalization pro-
cesses, the enormous social, political and economic transnational interdependence, 
and risks and opportunities entailed by new means of communication and technolo-
gy, this approach creates a protection vacuum . Targeted killings by unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) or trans-border surveillance systems, as the paramount examples of 
security interventions of our time, reflect this: Today, states can violate human rights 
without having to set foot on the territory the victim resides on . Extraterritorial in-
telligence strategies that establish “legal black holes” are on the rise . Not only cyber- 
attacks and big data but also terrorism, climate change or global migration all intro-
duce novel dimensions of security challenges and multiply the scope of individuals 
a state can and does affect – at home as well as abroad . The security-related measures 
states adopt in these domains often come into conflict with human rights . In which 
way does the foundational idea that state conduct is constrained by human rights also 
1 This contribution forms part of a research project on “The Legal Philosophy of Extraterritorial Applica-
tions of Human Rights”, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and led by Prof . Matthias Mahl-
mann at the University of Zurich . An earlier version was presented in a workshop during the IVR World 
Congress 2017 in Lisboa . The author thanks the participants for their valuable feedback .
Li
ze
nz
ie
rt 
fü
r G
as
t a
m
 1
0.
03
.2
02
0 
um
 1
0:
03
 U
hr
Franz Steiner Verlag
104 Angela Müller
pertain to these transnational, diagonal relations between states and “outsiders”2? This 
contribution intends to comment on the legitimacy of states’ extraterritorial human 
rights obligations from the perspective of legal philosophy .3
Many scholars involved in the debate take the general legitimacy of extraterritorial 
obligations for granted (and rather focus on determining their exact scope or details 
of implementation) . However, this is in tension with, first, political reality and the fact 
that some states (thus the duty-bearers at stake) still reject that IHRL puts them under 
any duties abroad – in general and/or in concrete cases .4 Current tendencies to revert 
to concepts of nationalism, exclusion and sovereignty indicate that this opposition is 
unlikely to disappear anytime soon . Though new, transnational institutions may have 
divested the state of its unique significance, it still amounts to a central agent – espe-
cially when it comes to human rights protection .5 Second, while many experts and 
interpretive bodies tend to allow for extensive extraterritorial application of IHRL,6 
the starting point of one of the most influential institutions in the field, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), still seems to be one of territorial application, so 
that it is the expansion of duties beyond territory that is in need of justification – at least 
this is what its case law implies . Lastly, in normative theory, the general idea of univer-
sal human rights has been confronted with increasing revisionist criticism .
2 The terms “outsiders” and “non-members” are used for denoting individuals who are not located on a 
state’s territory, as opposed to “insiders”, “residents”, or “members” .
3 “Extraterritoriality” refers to the application of norms outside a state’s territory . The question here is 
whether IHRL norms, to which state A is bound, are to be applied vis-à-vis person X who is not located on 
A’s territory . It is irrelevant where the actions of A take place on territory or not: The decisive criterion for 
extraterritoriality is the location of X, the addressee of the norm and the potential victim of violations, cf . 
Menno T . Kamminga, Extraterritoriality, in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL), 
ed . by Rüdiger Wolfrum, 2012, <http://opil .ouplaw .com/view/10 .1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1040> [accessed 21 .10 .2017], chap . A1 . Further, the focus on states does not imply that these 
are necessarily the only bearers of moral and legal human rights duties . Lastly, states often do not de facto 
turn a blind eye to the misery abroad, e . g . by providing development aid . But the problem arises when it is 
denied that they are obliged to do so, when it is viewed as supererogatory acts of charity rather than as a way 
of discharging stringent duties .
4 See e . g . CCPR, Concluding Observations Israel, CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, 21 .11 .2014, § 5; CCPR, Conclud-
ing Observations USA, CCPR/C/USA/CO/4, 23 .4 .2014, § 4; Submission of the United Kingdom, Discussion 
on ICESCR Draft General Comment 24, 2017, <http://www .ohchr .org/Documents/HRBodies/CESCR/
Discussions/2017/58-Government of the United Kingdom .pdf> [accessed 29 .6 .2018], 2; Submission of Nor-
way, Discussion on ICESCR Draft General Comment 24, 2017, <http://www .ohchr .org/Documents/HR 
Bodies/CESCR/Discussions/2017/Norway .pdf> [accessed 29 .6 .2018], 3 f . It is also domestic courts that 
deny extraterritorial reach, e . g . Human Rights Watch Inc & Ors v  The Secretary of State for the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office & Ors, [2016] UKIPTrib15_165-CH, 16 .5 .2016, §§ 49 ff ., 60 ff .
5 Cf . David P . Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 4th edn, 2018, 250 f ., 372, 390 ff .
6 Cf . e . g . IAComHR, Coard et al  v  United States, 10 .951, 29 .9 .1999, OEA/Ser .L/V/II .106, Doc .6 rev . 
(1999), § 37; CCPR, General Comment 31 (80), CCPR/C/21/Rev .1/Add .13, 26 .5 .2004, § 10; ICJ, Legal Con-
sequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion), ICJ Reports 
2004 (9 .7 .), 136, § 109; CAT, General Comment 3, CAT/C/GC/3, 13 .12 .2012, § 22; AfComHPR, General Com-
ment 3, 18 .11 .2015, § 14 .
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The persistence of the territorial paradigm is significant when considering the mani-
fold modern security measures that do not require any form of territorial authority: 
Can states escape human rights by sending UAVs or hacking e-mails from abroad? 
Moreover, it indicates research should still include foundational theoretical work on 
the general normative justification of extraterritorial obligations . To this aim, it is essen-
tial to systematically identify and address arguments on which a territorial view could 
be grounded . After a brief outline of an example from jurisprudence, this is what the 
present contribution aims to do . Thereby, it ultimately hopes to strengthen the norma-
tive foundation on which extraterritorial duties rest and to contribute to bridge the gap 
between political reality, scholarship and jurisprudence .
2  Illustrating the Legal Framework
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR provides the most extensive case law on the question 
of extraterritorial applicability, which is why it serves to illustrate the problem at hand . 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) holds that States Parties “shall 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms (…) of this Con-
vention” .7 In line with most other IHRL treaties, this makes the exercise of jurisdiction 
the central criterion for determining spatial applicability .8
In the landmark decision of Banković on NATO states’ bombing of Belgrade in 1999, 
the ECtHR interpreted this threshold criterion restrictively: It denied applicability of 
the Convention to this extraterritorial case based on a de iure conception of state juris-
diction derived from public international law, where it denotes the legal entitlement to 
prescribe, enforce and adjudicate regulation .9 Based on this understanding, the Court 
concluded that jurisdiction is inherently related to territory and that its extraterritorial 
exercise is limited to most extraordinary circumstances,10 such as when a state “through 
the effective control of the relevant territory”, established by occupation or home state 
consent, “exercises all or some of the public powers” .11 In addition, it emphasized the 
7 Art . 1 ECHR, emphasis added .
8 E . g . Art . 1 American Convention on Human Rights; Art . 2(1) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Art . 2(1) Convention on the Rights of the Child; Art . 3, 6, 
14(1) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination . Famously, the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) refers in Art . 2(1) to “all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction” . Today, it is widely agreed that this includes both people on territory 
and people under jurisdiction, cf . ICJ, Wall Opinion (Fn . 6), § 109; CCPR, López Burgos v  Uruguay, 52/1979, 
29 .7 .1981, CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, § 12 .3 .
9 ECtHR, Banković and Others v  Belgium and Others (dec ) [GC], 52207/99, 12 .12 .2001, ECHR 2001-XII, 
§§ 55, 59 f . On jurisdiction in public international law, Kamminga (Fn . 3), §§ 1 f .
10 ECtHR, Banković v  Belgium (Fn . 9), § 61 .
11 Ibid ., § 71 .
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“espace juridique”12 and the essentially regional character of the ECHR, which “was not 
designed to be applied throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Con-
tracting States” .13
Arguably, the implication of Banković was that there is not necessarily a problem 
with violating ECHR rights of people abroad, as long as there is no substantial control 
exercised over the area they are located on – which is insightful with respect to modern 
interventions via airstrikes or UAVs . This is in tension with the object and purpose of 
the treaty, which “aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and obser-
vance of the Rights therein declared”,14 as well as with the principle to interpret IHRL 
in dynamic ways in order to make it effective in addressing contemporary challenges .15 
Most centrally, de iure jurisdiction is not an appropriate applicability threshold for hu-
man rights: The question of whether it is lawful that a state’s acts have effects abroad (the 
question of de iure jurisdiction) is distinct from the question of whether a state is bound 
by human rights when its acts have effects abroad (regardless of how they came about) . 
In IHRL, the question must be the latter, namely whether jurisdiction is de facto exer-
cised .16
In the aftermath of Banković, the ECtHR has incrementally acknowledged a wider 
scope of applicability abroad by recognizing a de facto notion of jurisdiction, which 
can, moreover, also stem from personal authority a state agent exercises over an indi-
vidual .17 In the prominent case of Al-Skeini, it introduced a hybrid approach of both 
spatial and personal control, finding jurisdiction derived from state agent authority in a 
12 Ibid ., § 80; ECtHR, Cyprus v  Turkey [GC], 25781/94, 10 .5 .2001, ECHR 2001-IV, § 78 .
13 ECtHR, Banković v  Belgium (Fn . 9), § 80 .
14 Preamble ECHR, emphasis added .
15 ECtHR, Banković v  Belgium (Fn . 9), § 64 . Moreover, Banković also implicitly rejected the previously 
used alternative model of jurisdiction as state agent authority exercised over an individual, used e . g . in 
EComHR, Ramirez Sánchez v  France (dec ), 28780/95, 24 .6 .1996, DR 86-B, 155, 161 f .; EComHR, Stocké v  
Germany (dec ), 11755/85, 9 .7 .1987, Report of 12 .10 .1989, § 166; EComHR, Cyprus v  Turkey (dec ), 6780/74, 
6950/75, 26 .5 .1975, DR 2, 125, 136 .
16 This is widely shared, see e . g . Walter Kälin / Jörg Künzli, Universeller Menschenrechtsschutz, 3rd edn, 
2013, 146; Marko Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, 2013, 26 ff ., 198 f .; Michael 
Duttwiler, Authority, Control and Jurisdiction in the Extraterritorial Application of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, NQHR 30 (2012), 137–163, 140; CAT, General Comment 2, CAT/C/GC/2, 24 .1 .2008, 
§ 7 . Some authors explain the outcomes of Banković by the political environment shortly after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, in which the Court may just have feared the consequences of opening doors to people 
from all over the world to claim violations by ECHR states involved in the “War on Terror”, see e . g . Marko 
Milanović, Extraterritoriality and Human Rights: Prospects and Challenges, in: Human Rights and the Dark 
Side of Globalisation, ed . by Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen / Jens Vedsted-Hansen, 2016, 57; Mark Gibney, 
International Human Rights Law: Returning to Universal Principles, 2nd edn, 2016, 74 f .; Loukis Loucaides, 
Determining the Extra-Territorial Effect of the European Convention, EHRLR 4 (2006), 391–407, 400 f .
17 E . g . ECtHR, Öcalan v  Turkey [GC], 46221/99, 12 .5 .2005, ECHR 2005-IV, § 91; ECtHR, Issa and 
Others v  Turkey, 31821/96, 16 .11 .2004, unreported, § 71; ECtHR, Ilaşcu and Others v  Moldova and Russia 
[GC], 48787/99, 8 .7 .2004, ECHR 2004-VII, § 314 .
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situation in which a state exerted at least some public powers over the respective territo-
ry – even if located outside the espace juridique of the ECHR .18
However, while these later cases mirror a more generous approach, none of them 
has actually departed from the territorial paradigm . By emphasizing the significance 
of territorial authority (even if only instantiated through a checkpoint19) and by repeat-
edly confirming the essentially territorial nature of jurisdiction in almost all relevant 
cases,20 the ECtHR upholds its “presumption against the extraterritorial application” .21 
Its concept of jurisdiction appears symptomatic of the underlying territorial paradigm 
in IHRL . In what follows, one potential cluster of arguments behind such a paradigm 
will be critically discussed .22
3  The Objection from Sovereignty
Sovereignty describes the supreme authority to decide, set rules and be obeyed on a 
specific territory and over the population located therein . Rooted in the Westphalian 
system, it belongs to the main pillars upon which international law has been built .23 
While some early writers have conceptualized sovereignty as nearly absolute,24 it is 
acknowledged that a contemporary notion is one that is constrained . It has long been 
accepted that the recognition of sovereign equality of other states curtails external sov-
ereignty, motivated primarily by the idea of enabling co-existence: Sovereignty ends 
18 ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v  the United Kingdom [GC], 55721/07, 7 .7 .2011, ECHR 2011, §§ 130 ff ., 142, 149 .
19 ECtHR, Jaloud v  the Netherlands [GC], 47708/08, 20 .11 .2014, ECHR 2014, § 152 .
20 E . g . ECtHR, N  D  and N  T  v  Spain, 8675/15, 8697/15, 3 .10 .2017, unreported, §§ 50 f .; ECtHR, Jaloud 
v  the Netherlands (Fn . 19), § 131; ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v  Italy [GC], 27765/09, 23 .2 .2012, ECHR 
2012, §§ 71 f .; ECtHR, Al-Skeini v  United Kingdom (Fn . 18), §§ 131 f .
21 Nina Blum, The European Convention on Human Rights beyond the Nation-State, 2015, 2; Sigrun Skogly, 
Extraterritorial Obligations and the Obligation to Protect, in: The Changing Nature of Territoriality in In-
ternational Law, ed . by Martin Kuijer / Wouter Werner, NYIL 47 (2016), 217–244, 243; Duttwiler (Fn . 16), 
151 f .; Cedric Ryngaert, Clarifying the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Merkourios 28 (2012), 57–60, 57 f .; Mark Gibney, Universal Duties: The Responsibility to Protect, 
the Duty to Prevent (Genocide) and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations, Global Responsibility to 
Protect 3 (2011), 123–151, 150 .
22 Other theoretical frameworks in which arguments for a territorial view could be developed include 
theories of International Relations realism, particularism, patriotism, hierarchical nationalism and suprem-
acism, social contract theories, or relativism .
23 Daniel Philpott, Sovereignty, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed . by Edward N . Zalta, Sum-
mer 2016 edn, <https://plato .stanford .edu/archives/sum2016/entries/sovereignty/> [accessed 7 .4 .2018], 
chap . 1; Christine Kaufmann, Elemente des Staates, in: Staatsrecht, ed . by Giovanni Biaggini / Thomas 
Gächter / Regina Kiener, 2nd edn, 2015, 12–21, 17; Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 
EJIL 20 (2009), 513–544, 515 ff .
24 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth, ed . by Julian Harold 
Franklin, 1992; Thomas Hobbes, Hobbes’s Leviathan, 1952; Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur 
Lehre von der Souveränität, 10th edn, 2015 . Bodin and Hobbes accept some restraints to sovereignty stem-
ming from divine or natural law but none from any human-made law .
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where sovereignty of others begins . What is distinct of more modern conceptions is 
the claim that internal sovereignty exhibits not only a factual component of enforcing 
authority but also a substantive normative one, requiring that it be enforced in legiti-
mate ways: It comes with the responsibility for protecting residents’ human rights .25 At 
the same time, the Westpalian-inpired sovereignty principle still powerfully informs 
the foundations of the international system26: Sovereignty has not been “dethroned”27 
yet – as current political tendencies to fall back on ideas of far-reaching sovereignty 
and non-interference illustrate .
Coming to the topic at issue, even a modern conception of sovereignty that accepts 
some internal human rights constraints to sovereignty could reject the idea that it is 
also abridged by individual rights of outsiders: In order to serve its function as a pro-
tector of goods, a guarantor of well-being, autonomy and security of its population, a 
state must have certain privileges . Among them, so it might be claimed, is the privilege 
to be free from direct duties to individual non-members . Foreign states do not bear 
any human rights duties to them – and international law should not put them under 
such . If any duties to outside persons exist at all, these are not generated by their indi-
vidual rights but are a consequence of duties to other states . In treaty law, states could 
then consent to assume obligations to individuals abroad, but these are fully voluntary 
and supererogatory undertakings, which they are (morally) allowed to withdraw at any 
moment . States are also permitted to de facto contribute to human rights enjoyment 
abroad (as long as this does not infringe other states’ sovereignty), but there are nei-
ther pre-legal nor direct and consent-independent obligations to do so .28
Thus, even conceptions of sovereignty that accept material limits to domestic sov-
ereignty could provide a starting point for arguments against extraterritorial human 
rights duties . They are grounded on the nationalist worry of a fundamental conflict 
25 Philpott (Fn . 23), chap . 3; Matthias Mahlmann, Konkrete Gerechtigkeit, 4th edn, 2019, 81 ff .; Kaufmann 
(Fn . 23), 17 f . This is mirrored in the evolution of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) principle, which 
suggests that disregard for human rights internally results in a partial loss of external sovereignty rights, 
allowing others to intervene . While R2P is not yet a generally recognized binding norm, the existence of 
the debate highlights the change of perspective from sovereignty as a right to sovereignty as a responsibility .
26 The Charter of the United Nations emphasizes the sovereign equality of states (Art . 2(1)), prohib-
its attacks on independence and integrity (Art . 2(4)) and interventions in the domain réservé, the areas 
“essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” (Art . 2(7)) . For an overview, Samantha Besson, Sover-
eignty, in: MPEPIL (Fn . 3), 2011, <http://opil .ouplaw .com/view/10 .1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e1472> [accessed 31 .1 .2018], §§ 89, 95 ff .
27 Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity, AJIL 107 (2013), 295–333, 296 .
28 Such a view might e . g . be derived from Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and 
Equality, 1983, 47 ff ., or Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, Phil  & Pub  Aff  33 (2005), 113–147, 
who both grant only highly limited principles of aid to outside strangers . To illustrate, a similar view of con-
stitutional rights inspired the US Supreme Court when it held that “the purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was 
never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against 
aliens outside of the United States territory”, United States v  Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U . S . 259 (1990), 266 .
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between universal human rights and (popular) sovereignty: Sovereignty ultimately 
intends to protect the sovereign’s members . As a result, constraints from individual 
rights are only acceptable if they benefit those who make up the sovereign . The posi-
tion thereby defended is that sovereignty can only be safeguarded by domesticating 
human rights .29
 Objecting to the Sovereignty Objection
Is accepting some human rights-based limits to sovereignty compatible with maintain-
ing that these limits only apply to a part of states’ actions, namely those with effects 
on territory, but not to others, namely those that affect people abroad? Foundational 
normative considerations suggest otherwise .
First, human rights are not only limits to sovereignty . Judicially, sovereignty is not a 
pre-legal, self-standing principle on which international law is based . It is the other way 
round: It is constructed, ascribed, conditioned and organized by international law, as 
it was e . g . confirmed by the German Constitutional Court .30 Sovereignty is not about 
being free from any authority . It is compatible with being subjected to international 
law – and today, the latter is a legal system which acknowledges individuals as direct 
legal subjects and of which human rights form an essential part . 
Normatively, given that some individual-rights-based limits to sovereignty are ac-
cepted (namely those stemming from rights of insiders), it must also be accepted that 
the general value of sovereignty is of an instrumental nature: It is not assigned to states 
for its own sake but to enable them to protect individual goods . It is not only other 
states’ sovereignty but also individuals’ sovereignty that constrains states – expressed 
in fundamental human rights that secure basic prerogatives of the individual’s ability 
to realize goods, fulfil interests and satisfy needs in the first place .31 Importantly, these 
human rights do not just curtail but rather determine the legitimate scope of state sov-
ereignty: Human rights are not mere conflicting considerations to be weighed against 
it . Rather, they define and lend value to sovereignty in the first place, implying a pre-
sumption in favor of human rights from the outset .32
But if sovereignty is based on human rights, it is inconsistent to use it as exactly the 
opposite, namely as a bulwark against human rights obligations33 – even if the latter orig-
29 Cf . discussion in Cristina Lafont, Sovereignty and the International Protection of Human Rights, Jour-
nal of Political Philosophy 24 (2016), 427–445, 431 .
30 BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 30 June 2009–2 BvE 2/08 – §§ 1–421, 223; see also Besson 
(Fn . 26), § 109; Peters (Fn . 23) .
31 Mahlmann (Fn . 25), 80 ff .
32 Peters (Fn . 23), 514, 544 .
33 Margot E . Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights, 2007, 26; cf . Sigrun I . Skogly, Global Re-
sponsibility for Human Rights, OJLS 29 (2009), 827–847, 839 f .
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inate abroad . If it is used as such, its foundation collapses . If one proposes a territorial 
human rights regime, one still proposes a human rights regime . By embarking on the 
idea behind human rights, one cannot deny that they are by their very nature held 
qua being human thus qua something that all human beings universally share and that 
applies to all of them equally .34 If human rigths are accepted as constraints, so it seems, 
then the burden of proof is with those who maintain that these constraints do not per-
tain to expressions of sovereignty the effects of which happen to materialize beyond a 
state’s borders .
Second, the concept of sovereignty must be defined with regard to the nature of the 
entities it is ascribed to, namely (for present purposes) states . The moral status of states 
is not self-standing: They are essentially collective institutions the purpose of which is 
the realization of individual and common goods . Further, states are entitled to means 
of authority to which no other agent is: They are authorized to coerce and sanction 
people, to take their property in order to fund collective institutions and enable re-
distribution, to design education systems, or to use (military) force for self-defense . 
States can frame and impact individuals’ lives like, arguably, no other agent can . In 
addition, states are agents with enormous factual power at their disposal, like infra-
structure, police, armies, in addition to vast amounts of other financial, technological, 
personal and natural resources . Given this distinctive nature, the idea behind human 
rights obligations of states is motivated by the recognition that states’ entitlements 
cannot be unlimited, that individuals have to be protected from their use and potential 
abuse of power . Basic human interests must be defended by special means against this 
powerful agent – and human rights amount to such a mean . It is under these premises 
that principles that pertain to states, such as sovereignty, are ascribed and determined . 
That they generate a permission to disregard basic rights – whoever’s basic rights – does 
not appear in line with what states are here for in the first place .
What does this all mean for the problem of extraterritoriality? If universality is a 
feature of human rights, it should also apply in determining the scope of addressees of 
obligations .35 The question is not only whether rights apply to outsiders, but also wheth-
er a state (that is morally and legally bound by certain norms and, moreover, has vol-
untarily consented to them) may allow its agents and institutions to disobey these prin-
ciples, depending on where the effects of their conduct take shape . Human rights are 
grounded on the very nature of human beings, while human rights obligations apply 
to the state by virtue of the distinctive nature of this collective agent: Statehood is not 
34 Plausibly, one cannot deny that these rights are grounded on something all human beings share . This 
is not only one of the “vague and often misleading gestures to the universality of human rights”, Samantha 
Besson, The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights De-
pend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts To, LJIL 25 (2012), 857–884, 858 . A justificatory theo-
ry of extraterritorial human rights obligations needs to be based on a theory of what this something consists 
in, but this goes beyond the scope of the present paper .
35 Skogly (Fn . 33), 833 f .
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a necessary but a sufficient condition for being subject to them . States are the agents 
which mean the most serious threat to human rights enjoyment and, at the same time, 
they are those best equipped for protecting human rights . If such obligations apply by 
virtue of the state’s nature, then they apply to all of its conduct, regardless of where its 
effects are felt .36 Human rights obligations constrain states, because states are the way 
they are, and human rights are intended for what they are intended . Consequently, 
they constrain all of their conduct, legal or illegal, executive, legislative, administrative 
or judicative, actions as well as omissions,37 on territory as well as abroad: If people 
shall generally be protected from this extraordinary power with its huge potential of 
abuse, then border-transcending relations between individuals and third states should 
also be structured accordingly . As domestic violations are of international concern and 
contradict sovereignty (which is the very idea behind modern IHRL), extraterritorial 
violations cannot be protected by the sovereignty principle:38 In Anne Peters’ words, 
“no state can claim that its state sovereignty forbids cross-border concern for human-
ity: to make a sovereign claim is to declare oneself open to inspection in that regard” .39 
Otherwise, this would leave a significant protection vacuum .
Importantly, this last point is reinforced by the aspect that outsiders are usually not 
able to impact the decision-making process that governs state conduct . In order to be 
assured that third states’ conduct is not beyond law and morality, they are reliant on other 
protective instruments – most importantly, on human rights guarantees . These can func-
tion as a substitute that provides minimal protection for outsiders in their relations to 
third states, in which they lack (democratic) instruments typically available to insiders .40
Summing up, the idea that sovereignty is internally limited by rights of individuals 
but externally only by rights of other states is normatively not convincing41 – plus, it 
does neither correspond to contemporary international law, which accepts individuals 
as direct legal subjects, nor to global reality, in which states have countless security 
measures at their disposal through which they can impact people abroad .
36 As statehood is not a necessary condition for being a human-rights duty-bearer, this claim does neither 
commit one to exclude moral and/or legal human rights obligations of non-state actors .
37 The question on how far positive extraterritorial obligations go is intensely discussed but beyond the 
scope of this article . Plausibly, at least states’ acts and omissions with direct, foreseeable and significant 
effects on human rights enjoyment of individuals should be covered, see Yuval Shany, Taking Universality 
Seriously: A functional approach to Extraterritoriality in Human Rights Law, LEHR 7 (2013), 47–71, 69 .
38 Sigrun I . Skogly / Mark Gibney, Transnational Human Rights Obligations, HumRtsQ 24 (2002), 781–
798, 798 .
39 Peters (Fn . 23), 543 .
40 Similarly Allen Buchanan, Why International Legal Human Rights?, in: Philosophical Foundations of 
Human Rights, ed . by Rowan Cruft / S . Matthew Liao / Massimo Renzo, 2015, 244–262, 256 . Lafont impor-
tantly objects that not only democratic states exhibit such flaws, Lafont (Fn . 29), 43 f .
41 Moreover, the objection would implicitly assume that not being under duties to individual non-mem-
bers is compatible with not violating other states’ sovereignty . Yet, when UK state agents violate human 
rights of Iraqi residents, e . g . by contributing to torture, it is doubtful whether this is in compliance with 
respect for Iraq’s sovereignty .
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4  Coming Back to Legal Implementation
Linking the interpretation of legal norms to a philosophical normative background 
theory is of paramount importance in the domain of human rights, given their concep-
tualization and the intention behind them . In the question at issue, it can contribute to 
the development of coherent, well-informed principles in interpreting the applicabili-
ty threshold jurisdiction .
The theoretical conception that should underlie jurisdiction is a widely debated is-
sue . In the position as developed here, it is neither effective overall control (as the EC-
tHR suggests) nor the exercise of normative authority (i . e . authority that exhibits a 
reason-generating dimension that calls for compliance and is exercised with a claim to 
legitimacy, as some authors propose42) that subjects states to human rights obligations . 
With respect to human rights, not only those subject to effective control or normative 
authority but everyone is a stakeholder . Next to their unique ability to exercise norma-
tive authority, states are also agents with enormous de facto power and it is also by virtue 
of this dimension that they can gravely impact individuals’ lives . As a result, everyone 
affected by state conduct shall be safeguarded by this minimally protective instrument 
that human rights offer .43 This is one of the crucial intentions behind internationaliz-
ing human rights law: Human rights are a means to protect those affected from state 
conduct in light of the fact that they do not have the instruments typically available to 
those who are more substantially subjected and who often are, in addition, protected by 
domestic fundamental rights guarantees . From that perspective, the element of some 
form of (territorial) normative authority, such as a checkpoint,44 might be an indication 
but not a necessary condition for jurisdiction . This is most relevant in the field of modern 
security measures: If states affect people without exercising any form of normative au-
thority (which is often the case e . g . when it comes to extraterritorial surveillance that 
is commanded on their own territory), they are still bound to human rights . States can-
not, by acting as mere de facto powers, establish a human-rights-free zone .
An important objection to such a view points to prudential considerations that call 
for constraining at least legal obligations to territory: While agreeing with the overall 
goal of realizing universal human rights enjoyment, one might argue that a territorial 
distribution of duties would most effectively and efficiently realize this goal – in light 
of the unenforceability of extraterritorial duties, the difficulty of allocating them to 
multiple duty-bearers, the limited foreseeability of effects abroad and the complexi-
ty of causal chains, the fragmentation of responsibility, the risk of overload for both 
42 Besson (Fn . 34), 860 ff ., 864 f ., 873 f .; similarly Duttwiler (Fn . 16), 157 ff .
43 See also David Cole, Rights over Borders, Cato Supreme Court Review (2008), 47–61, 60, who under-
lines that democratic procedures alone do not yet guarantee respect for human rights .
44 ECtHR, Jaloud v  the Netherlands (Fn . 19), § 152 .
Li
ze
nz
ie
rt 
fü
r G
as
t a
m
 1
0.
03
.2
02
0 
um
 1
0:
03
 U
hr
Franz Steiner Verlag
113Security Measures Abroad and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations 
courts and states as well as the danger of self-interested interventions under the guise 
of human rights .
A discussion of these points goes beyond the scope of this paper, but one general 
consideration shall be alluded to: The assumption of universal rights and obligations is 
perfectly compatible with maintaining that such norms are in need of contemporary, 
context-specific implementation and that particular challenges states face, such as the 
one of extraterritoriality, can legitimately be considered in determining legal account-
ability in concrete cases .45 Yet, while such extraterritorial duties are demanding, strin-
gent and inconvenient, it is also true that they apply to states as institutions, which are 
precisely intended for meeting stringent demands .
Moreover, such prudential concerns are necessarily contingent, depending on po-
litical, social, economic and technological circumstances . In today’s world, with the 
many extraterritorial instruments it offers, it is unlikely that generally allowing states 
to disregard human rights beyond borders will provide the most effective protection 
system . Thus, mere practical reasons do not suffice for justifying a systematic exclusion 
of duties to those abroad . Accepting the extraterritorial reach of IHRL amounts to a 
contemporary requirement, too .
5  Conclusion
It is not denied that states, territorial associations and sovereignty continue to be of rel-
evance . What must be denied is that they allow states to fully disregard non-members’ 
claims in the area of human rights . At least for this actor (state) on this level (institution-
al) and within this field (human rights), such principles do not curtail obligations . The 
territorial paradigm, often portrayed as reflecting both commonsense morality and 
opinio iuris, is in tension with why we have human rights in the first place .
In the context of security, theoretically informed reinterpretation of the appli-
cability trigger jurisdiction must aim at reinforcing the capability of IHRL to meet 
threats that contemporary security measures mean to human rights – at home or 
abroad . States must be bound by human rights even if they do not exert any territo-
rial but only factual or virtual control .46 There are no human-rights-free zones when 
it comes to state conduct that affects human beings . Acknowledging the legitimacy 
45 Cf . e . g . S . Matthew Liao, Human Rights as Fundamental Conditions for a Good Life, in: Cruft/Liao/
Renzo (Fn . 40), 79–100, 95 ff .; Carl Wellman, The Moral Dimensions of Human Rights, 2011 .
46 On virtual control, e . g . Francesca Bignami / Giorgio Resta, Human Rights Extraterritoriality: The 
Right to Privacy and National Security Surveillance, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper 67 (2017), 
<http://scholarship .law .gwu .edu/cgi/viewcontent .cgi?article=2562&context=faculty_publications> [ac-
cessed 3 .10 .2017], 5 .
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of extra territorial human rights obligations is not taken to be the solution to all se-
curity-related problems or to amount to a thorough account of global justice . But 
it is one of the many necessary roads that need to be taken, not least in light of the 
global status quo .
DOI 10 .25162/arsp-2019-0028
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